The book includes selected papers of Morris Goldstein on the following topics in international macroeconomics: international trade, currency regimes, exchange rate policy, international policy coordination, banking, financial crises, financial regulation, IMF policies, and China's exchange rate policy. Some of the papers are empirical in nature, while others address key policy issues in international macroeconomics. Many of the papers are co-authored with other well-known international economists, including Jacob Frenkel, Mohsin Khan, Nicholas Lardy, Peter Montiel, Michael Mussa, Carmen Reinhart, and Philip Turner, among others. Taken as a group, the papers should give the reader a good picture of many of the most important issues in international macroeconomics over the past 35 years.
In this analysis, Morris Goldstein examines currency-regime choices for emerging economies that are heavily involved with private capital markets. The author argues that the best regime choice for such economies would be managed floating plus, where plus is shorthand for a framework that includes inflation targeting and aggressive measures to discourage currency mismatching. Goldstein argues that if managed floating were enhanced in this way, it would retain the desirable features of a flexible rate regime while addressing the nominal anchor and balance-sheet problems that have historically underpinned a fear of floating and handicapped the performance of managed floating in emerging economies. The author also shows why managed floating plus is superior to four alternative currency-regime options-an adjustable peg system, a BBC (basket, band, crawl) regime, a currency board, and dollarization.
The turmoil that rocked Asian foreign exchange and equity markets after the middle of 1997 and that spread far afield is the third major currency crisis of the 1990s. Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea suffered outright recessions in 1998 and forecast growth rates in the rest of emerging Asia are either negative or well below their pre-crisis level. In an effort to contain the crisis, almost $120 billion has been pledged in IMF-led official rescue packages. How could this happen to a group of countries that has been so highly regarded in the 1990s by private international capital markets? How could the crisis be overcome and what changes are necessary to prevent it from happening again? Mo...
This study presents the case for an international banking standard (IBS) to deal with the rash of banking crises in developing countries. Over the past 15 years, almost three-fourths of the IMF's member countries have experienced at least one serious bout of banking problems; there have been at least a dozen developing country episodes where the costs of these crises amounted to 10% or more of the country's GDP; & the total public sector resolution costs of developing-country banking crises have been estimated to be $25 billion. Not only are these banking crises extremely costly to developing countries, they also pose increased risk to industrial countries. The author demonstrates that existing international agreements do not address the main sources of these crises & the adoption of a voluntary IBS offers a more attractive route to banking reform than the relevant alternatives. The study recommends minimum standards in eight key areas of banking supervision & addresses the operational issues associated with the design & implementation of an IBS.
In most of the currency crises of the 1990s, the largest output falls have occurred in those emerging economies with large currency mismatches, a phenomenon that occurs when assets and liabilities are denominated in different currencies such that net worth is sensitive to changes in the exchange rate. Currency mismatching makes crisis management much more difficult since it constrains the willingness of the monetary authority to reduce interest rates in a recession (for fear of initiating a large fall in the currency that would bring with it large-scale insolvencies). The mismatching also produces a "fear of floating" on the part of emerging economies, sometimes inducing them to make currency-regime choices that are not in their own long-term interest. Authors Morris Goldstein and Philip Turner summarize what is known about the origins of currency mismatching in emerging economies, discuss how best to define and measure currency mismatching, and review policy options for reducing the size of the problem.
This report comprises three papers written by staff members of the Fund's Research Department on issues arising out of the reports on the international monetary system prepared in 1985 by the Group of Ten (representing the industrial countries participating in the General Arrangements to Borrow) and the intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs. These two reports, which appear as appendices to this volume, were transmitted to the Interim Committee of the Fund's Board of Governors and were subsequently discussed by the Fund's Executive Board in early 1986.
Spurred by the success of the first stress test of US banks toward the end of the global economic crisis in 2009, stress testing of large financial institutions has become the cornerstone of banking supervision worldwide. The aim of the tests is to determine which banks are adequately capitalized under severe economic shocks and to order corrective measures for those that are vulnerable. In Banking’s Final Exam, one of the world’s leading experts on banking regulation concludes that the tests administered on both sides of the Atlantic suffer from fundamental weaknesses, leading to a false sense of reassurance about the safety and soundness of the banking system. Some weaknesses can be corrected within the existing bank-capital regime, but others will require bold reforms—including higher minimum capital requirements for the largest and most systemically-important banks. The banking industry is likely to resist these reforms, but this book explains why their objections do not hold water.